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Abstract 
 
We propose a method of antimonopoly regulation in a day-ahead power market 
with locational marginal pricing which forms economic incentives for a producer, 
operating a portfolio of generating units, to submit an offer indicating its true cost 
and faithful values of technical parameters, entering generating units’ constraints. 
The uncertainty faced by regulator when applying the method affects neither 
nodal output/consumption volumes nor locational marginal prices but manifests 
itself in overall uplift/downlift for the market, which may be allocated among the 
other market players in a way preserving the price signals produced by the 
market. 
 
 
Keywords: Power system economics, electricity market, nodal pricing, antimonopoly 
regulation, price discrimination 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Many power sector reforms, undertaken across the globe, resulted in formation of 
liberalized electricity markets with free pricing for power and security constrained economic 
dispatch based on financially binding bids/offers supplied by the market players [1]-[3]. The 
goal of the liberalized electricity market in the short-run is to determine the optimal power 
output and consumption volumes as well as the prices, which support those volumes (up to 
applicable side-payments). The optimality criterion is set by the proper objective function 
usually having the form of total social welfare of the market.  
Exercise of the market power in the liberalized power markets and associated deadweight 
loss has been a topic of intensive research [4]-[10], including the markets with forward 
contracts [11]-[19]. These works suggest that since power systems have to account for 
network power flow constraints, physical limits on units’ power output rates, power flow 
equations (Kirchhoff laws), as well as other constraints, the electricity markets proved to be 
prone to market power abuse even in the cases with no apparent dominant market players and 
acceptable levels of standard market power indicators. 
Producer with market power may distort both the offered cost of power output as well as 
technical parameters of the generating units, which result in allocative and productive 
inefficiency and lead to the associated deadweight loss and economic surplus redistribution. 
The set of standard policies to reduce market power include both measures which affect the 
market structure (such as forced divestiture of generating capacity, affiliation and merger 
control) and behavioral limitations (introduction of mandatory hedging rate, application of 
tariffs or price-caps, etc.). Since regulator lacks full information on the relevant cost 
components of a power producer as well as technical constraints on producer’s power output 
rate, application of behavioral limitations leads to both price and output/consumption volumes 
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distortion relative to the ones obtained in the case of perfectly competitive producer’s offer 
reflecting short-run marginal cost of power output and actual values of technical parameters. 
Thus, it is important to design antimonopoly measures that minimize effect on market prices 
and volumes from error in regulator’s estimate of producer power output expenses as well as 
technical parameters of its generating units. 
It is well-known that producer, able to perfectly price discriminate consumers, sells the 
same amount of goods as it does in the case of it being a price-taker and captures all the 
market surplus. Thus, it may prove to be beneficial for the market to create an economic 
environment where producer with market power is able to perfectly price discriminate but is 
deprived of a proper share of market surplus intended for the other market players.  
That approach (embedded in the form of vesting contract) was developed in [20], [21] for 
the case of a firm with market power operating single generating unit. The proposed 
antimonopoly regulation method introduces special pricing principle for the firm which forms 
economic incentives for it to offer power at the marginal cost (i.e., behave as if the generator 
had not had market power at all) under the assumption that actual technical parameters of the 
firm’s generating unit are known to regulator. If the firm behaves rationally (i.e., maximizes 
its profit), the method shields the market output/consumption volumes from the error in 
regulator’s estimate of the firm’s true short-run marginal cost. Thus, the error doesn’t affect 
the output/consumption volumes but manifests itself in the final prices through an overall 
uplift/downlift for the market, which implies redistribution of market surplus without 
affecting the total market surplus.  
In the present paper we extend the method further to a profit maximizing firm with market 
power, operating portfolio of generating units located in different nodes, for the case of 
electricity market with locational (nodal) marginal pricing and remove the assumption that 
regulator has full information on the technical parameters of the firm’s generating units. 
Instead of utilizing vesting contract as in [20], [21], it is proposed to apply special pricing 
algorithm for a producer with market power. We show that the error in regulator’s estimate 
appears only in uplift/downlift for the market affecting neither output/consumption volumes 
of all the market players nor the locational marginal prices in the power system. If the 
associated uplift/downlift for the market is relatively small, it doesn’t produce significant 
incentives for the market players to distort their market bids/offers. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section II we formulate the profit optimization 
problem for a price-discriminating producer, sections III-IV provide description of the 
proposed antimonopoly algorithm, which is further refined for the case of energy only DAM 
with set unit commitment in section V. Section VI illustrates how the proposed method is 
related to the perfect price discrimination of the residual demand using the locational marginal 
prices. We conclude with section VII, while some relevant mathematical derivations are 
located in Mathematical Appendix.   
Since most practical optimization problems in power markets involve continuous 
objective functions optimized over compact feasible sets, we assume that all maxima stated in 
the paper are attainable. 
 
II. Perfect price discrimination of the residual demand 
 
Consider wholesale two-settlement electric power market (day-ahead market (DAM) 
and real-time balancing market) operating on bid-based security constrained economic 
dispatch principle according to the financially binding offers/bids supplied by wholesale 
market players.  
Let DAM with hourly locational (nodal) marginal pricing be cleared simultaneously 
for all hours of the next day based on the optimization of the market utility (objective) 
function U  with optimization variables Z  taking values in
ZM  and being subject to a set of 
constraints }{ C  involving both constraints in the form of equalities as well as those in the 
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form of weak inequalities. DAM may have either power output/consumption volumes 
optimized separately from the other relevant products and services (such as ancillary services) 
or optimized jointly, also unit commitment schedule can be either set prior to DAM or 
integrated in DAM optimization. Variables Z  may include both discrete and continuous 
variables as it is in the case of DAM simultaneously solving the unit commitment as well as 
economic dispatch problems. 
ZM  is assumed to be a product of the proper discrete space and 
Euclidean space. The set }{ C  typically includes generating unit constraints, transmission 
constraints due to the power flow thermal or security limits, balance equations for power at 
each node, power losses and power flow equations (Kirchhoff laws), etc. The generating unit 
constraints include minimal/maximal output volumes, ramping rates, fuel constraints, and so 
on. If DAM also determines the unit commitment schedule, then the generating unit 
constraints include generator minimal up/down time limits, info on must run statuses, etc. 
Thus, we consider the fairly general DAM model. 
  We also assume that the structure of power offers for DAM allows suppliers to specify 
exactly all the relevant cost components for power output (including power output costs, start-
up, and no-load costs) as well as parameters entering the generating unit constraints. Thus, 
generator DAM offer includes both offer cost function and the parameters. 
Let’s denote as   the set of parameters entering the constraints }{ C  and specifying 
technical characteristics of the market players generating units, power network (such as power 
line admittances, maximal transmission capacities), etc. (We note that 
ZM  is independent 
from  ). Let’s )( ZD  denote a feasible set specified by }{ C , i.e., a set of possible values of 
Z  consistent with the constraints. In what follows the feasible set )( ZD  is assumed to be 
nonempty. 
The DAM optimization problem has the form 
)(max)(max 
,
}.{.
,
ZUZU
ZDZ
Z
Cts
Z

   (1) 
with market utility function gc UUU  , where cU  and gU  are the total cost of power 
consumption as bid by the consumers and the total cost of power (as well as all the applicable 
products and services considered in DAM) as offered by the suppliers respectively. If 
consumers may submit only totally inelastic DAM bids then usually the term cU  is omitted 
from the function U  and the set }{ C  is properly extended to account for the fixed 
consumption volumes.  
We will also assume that DAM and real-time balancing market converge and no 
arbitrage of any kind is possible for a producer between the DAM and real-time market: it is 
not profitable for the firm to sacrifice (part of) its DAM earnings for (expected) 
complementary gain in the real-time market and vice-versa. Hence the profit maximization 
problem for the power producer at the wholesale power market cascades into the 
consequential solutions of the corresponding problems for the DAM and real-time market. 
 Consider a profit maximizing firm G , operating a portfolio of generating units 
(possibly assigned to different nodes of the power system) selling power output directly at the 
DAM at the locational marginal prices (and applicable side-payments), i.e., not having any 
physical/financial contracts for power.  
Let variables X  be a subset of Z  referring to the firm’s G  generating units, 
variables Y  denote the rest of variables Z : },{ YXZ   with X  and Y  taking values 
in
XM  and YM  respectively, YXZ MMM   (note that if DAM is run after the unit 
commitment procedure so that Z  include only continuous variables, then ||ZZ RM   and 
||X
X RM  , 
||Y
Y RM  , where ||   denote cardinality of  a set). Denote as )(XD  a set of X  
such that there exists at least one corresponding )( ZDZ . We also define ),( XDY   as a 
set of possible values of Y  in 
YM  for each )( XDX  . 
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Let’s separate   into },{ 
GG
   with subset G  being parameters of the G ’s 
generating units specified by the firm, and 
G
  referring to the parameters of the other market 
players generating units, power network (such as power line admittances, maximal 
transmission capacities), etc. Let’s identify the part of }{C  referring to the generating units 
constraints of G  and transform constraints }{C  into the following equivalent 
form )}),({)},,(({}{  ZCXCC
GGG
  with )},({ GG XC   being the generating units 
constraints of the firm G  (constraints on minimal/maximal output, ramping constraints, etc.) 
and )},({ ZC
G
 referring to the rest of the constraints }{ C  and possibly depending on both 
G
  and G  (as it is, for example, in the case of unit commitment problem integrated into 
DAM optimization). Then ),( XDY   for a given )( XDX   is a subset of Y  in YM  such 
that constraints )},,({ YXC
G
 hold. (We note that there is a degree of arbitrariness in that 
partition of constraints as constraints of the form ),( GXC   can be included in a set 
)},({ ZC
G
 and not in )},({ GG XC  , however that doesn’t affect the conclusions of this 
section. In section V we impose additional assumptions on the set of constraints and largely 
remove that arbitrariness). 
Denoting as )( GXS   a set of possible values of X  defined by )},({ GG XC  , i.e., 
)},({ GG XC   are satisfied if and only if )( GXSX  , we have this set restricted further by 
)},({ ZC
G
 to )( XD , therefore, )()( GXX SD   . (Note that the set of Z  satisfying 
)},({ GG XC   is given by YGX MS  )(  ). Let’s denote as )( ZS  a set of possible values of Z  
in 
ZM  satisfying )},({ ZCG . The market utility function can be expressed as  
)()(),( XOYUYXU GG     (2) 
with )(XOG  being the sum of (possibly multi-component) offer cost functions of the firm G  
generating units, and )(YU
G
 being the rest of U  describing the other market players 
offered/bid power costs at DAM. Although for DAM it is sufficient to have )(XOG  defined 
for )( XDX  , we assume )(XOG  to be defined for )( GXSX  : in practice it is common 
to have )(XOG  defined for )( GXSX   both because )(XD  is usually not known to a 
power producer due to lack of information about bids/offers of the other market players 
and/or complexity of the power system, and because real-time markets, which should also 
accommodate for changes in )(XD , often utilize the producers DAM offers. We note that 
the function ),( YXU  and, hence, )(YU
G
 may be independent from some of the variables Y  as 
it is in the case of AC power flow model with variables Y  also including voltage magnitude 
and phase angle variables, which usually do not explicitly enter the market utility function. 
Also assumed independence of )(YU
G
 from external parameters   doesn’t imply loss of 
generality as starting with 
G
U , depending on  , the set Y can be enlarged to include 
additional optimization variables with values constrained at  . These variables can be used to 
remove   - dependence of 
G
U  at the expense of having   - dependent feasible set for 
optimization variables, which is exactly the case under consideration. Introduction of G -
dependence of GO  can be straightforwardly accounted for in the analysis below. 
We assume that DAM outcome, provided by the optimization problem (1) with market 
utility function of the form (2) with the firm G  offering to DAM its true cost and faithful 
values of technical parameters, is viewed as optimal by the regulator. (In the case of G  being 
natural monopoly that may not be true as typically used natural monopoly price regulation 
methods set the volume of goods delivered using average cost of production, not marginal 
5 
 
cost of production, and hence these regulation methods don’t maximize the social welfare 
function of the market).  
Let GB  be the firm G  DAM offer including both G  and )(XOG  defined 
for )( GXSX  . As the (conjectured by G ) profit maximizing DAM offer of a firm with 
market power may differ from its offer in the case of the perfect competition, let trueGB  denote 
the firm G  DAM offer indicating true cost components as well as actual parameters entering 
the generating unit constraints: },{ trueG
true
G
true
G OB   with )(XO
true
G  defined for 
all )( trueGXSX  . If GB  differs from
true
GB , then DAM outcome may result in the dead-
weight loss for the market. Moreover, if GB  includes G  such that )()( 
true
GXGX SS   , 
then – if (1) has a solution – it doesn’t belong to ),(
G
true
GZD  , and the system rebalancing 
might be needed in the real-time market as the firm G  will not be able to 
deliver )( trueGXSX  . Therefore, to assess the market impact of the solution 
),( 
G
true
GZDZ   the real-time market operation analysis is needed. To circumvent that issue 
we recall the assumption of no arbitrage between the DAM and real-time market, which for 
the case in question may be viewed as formally setting very high cost for the firm G  for not 
delivering (being able to deliver) exactly X  at the real-time market, so that for a solution 
with )( trueGXSX   the expected real-time market penalty for the firm definitely outweighs its 
possible DAM gain. Let’s define G  as a set of G  such that )()( 
true
GXGX SS   , i.e., the set 
of all G  specifying technologically feasible domain of X . Thus, if we focus on a set of 
offers GB  with GG  , then the abovementioned dead-weight loss for the market may be 
assessed applying the utility function trueU  defined as )()(),( XOYUYXU trueGG
true   for 
),( 
GGZ
DZ   as the difference between its values at the DAM outcomes with offers GB  
and trueGB . (The function )(XO
true
G  is well-defined for all )( XDX   with GG  , since 
GG   we have )()()( 
true
GXGXX SSD   ). 
Let
G
B  be a set of DAM bids/offers submitted by the other market players, 
and ],[ *
GG
BBZ  be a solution to (1) with utility function U  and the corresponding feasible 
set )( ZD , depending also on specified in the offer GB  parameters entering the generating 
unit constraints. Let’s denote by ],[),( **0
*
0
*
0 G
true
G BBZYXZ   the outcome of (1) when the 
firm G  submits DAM offer trueGB  (if DAM problem (1) has multiple solutions for 
*
0Z , then 
*
0Z  denotes any of these solutions): 
)()()( *0
*
0
*
0 XOYUZU
true
GG
true  , with 
),,(
,
*
0
*
0
)(max)(
XDY
Y
GG
G
true
GY
YUYU

 .  (3) 
We also assume that *0ZZ   maximizes value of )(ZU
true  over all )( ZDZ  with 
technologically feasible values of X : 
)(max)(
),,(
,,
*
0 ZUZU
true
DZ
Z
true
GG
GGZ
G






,  (4) 
which implies 
]),[(max)( *
,
*
0 GG
true
B
true BBZUZU
GG
G



. 
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Note that in RHS of (4) the function )(ZU true  is optimized over ),(
GGZ
D
GG




, which 
includes  ),(
G
true
GZD  , and since the constraint functions )},({ ZCG  in general case depend 
on G , the set  ),( GGZD
GG




 may be larger than ),(
G
true
GZD  . Thus, the equation (4) is 
not a trivial identity, but states that at ),(
*
0 G
true
GZDZ   the function )(ZU
true  attains its 
maximal value on a set ),(
GGZ
DZ
GG




 . However, if GG   we have 
),(),(
G
true
GZGGZ
DD   , then ),(),(
G
true
GZGGZ
DD
GG




  and (4) is trivially satisfied.  
As economic goal of a profit maximizing firm G  with market power may be 
misaligned with that of the market, i.e., market utility optimization, GB  may differ 
from trueGB . As a remedy for that problem we propose a special pricing algorithm for the firm 
G , producing power (and supplying all the applicable products and services), that will match 
the profit maximization problem of G  with DAM utility maximization problem and form 
economic incentives for the firm to submit an offer trueGB . The stated no-arbitrage principle 
yields both that G  attempts to maximize its DAM profit and that the firm’s offer indicates 
technical parameters GG  .  
Let us choose the pricing algorithm for power output by G  so that its DAM revenue 
from delivering *X ,  corresponding to },{ 
*** YXZ   - a solution of (1), is given by 
cYU
G
XDY
Y
Y


)(max 
),(
,
*
  (5) 
with c  being a parameter independent from *X  and G . In this case   - the daily DAM 
profit function for G - is given by 
 
cXOYUX trueGG
XDY
Y
G
GGY


)()(max),( 
),,(
,

 , ),(
GGX
DX   , GG   .     (6) 
Using 
 
)(max 
),(
,,
ZU true
DZ
Z
GG
Z
G






= ),(max
),,(),(
,,,
YXU true
XDYDX
YX
GG
YX
G





= )]()(max[max
),(
,
),(
,,
XOYU trueGG
XDY
Y
DX
X
Y
GG
X
G



 



 
 
we have  
),(max)(max 
),,(
,,
),(
,,
G
DX
X
true
DZ
Z
XcZU
GG
GGX
G
GG
Z
G











 . (7) 
Equations (3), (4), and (7) imply 
 
),()()()()(max),(max *0
*
0
*
0
*
0
),,(
,
),,(
,,
*
0
true
G
true
GG
true
G
XDY
Y
GG
DX
X
XcXOYUcXOYUX
G
true
GY
GG
GGX
G









. 
Thus, at the point *0XX  , 
true
GG   , the function  ),( GX   attains its maximal value. We 
stress that maximizer of ),( GX   may not be unique. For example, if ),( XDY   is 
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independent from G , i.e., ),(),( XDXD GYY   , and there exists G

 such that 
),(),(*0 G
true
GXGGX
DDX  

, then at *0XX  , GG 

  the function ),( GX   also 
attains its maximal value:  ),(),( *0
*
0
true
GG XX  

. That implies that a number of different 
sets of parameters G , entering G ’s generating units’ constraints, may result in the same 
maximizing value of  X . Likewise, (6) may have multiple solutions with different X , but 
identical G . (For example, in the case of DAM solving unit-commitment problem it is well 
known that in special cases one can have a solution with a particular generating unit being on 
with the same value of DAM market utility function as in the case with that generation unit 
being off.) Thus, the offer trueGB  may not be the unique offer of G , producing the maximum 
value ),( *0
true
GX   of the profit function (6). However, to compose the other optimal offer the 
firm G  may need some information on )(YU
G
 and ),,( XD
GGY
 , which in general case is 
not available to the firm since bids/offers of the other market players are not known to G  at 
the gate closure time for DAM bid/offer submittal, regardless of whether the firm has full 
information on ),,( XD
GGY
  for each ),(
GGX
DX  . Therefore, the offer
true
GB  is the 
natural choice among the set of the firm’s offers, which maximize the profit function, as no 
forecasting of the unknown parameters is needed for the firm to compose it. 
We emphasize that for our analysis to be valid, the parameter c , which is independent 
from X  and G , should be also independent from the firm’s present offer GB  as well as its 
previous DAM offers or any other potentially intentionally distorted information provided by 
the firm, since the firm G  should not be able to influence the value of c  for a given day as 
well as for the future days by adjusting the offer GB . Otherwise, the firm may find it 
profitable to submit DAM offer (including the parameters entering the generating units’ 
constraints) which is not maximizing the profit function for the day in question treating c  as 
being independent from GB  but is favorably distorting the value of c  for the future time 
periods. 
 
III. Description of the proposed antimonopoly regulation method 
 
The next questions to deal with are how to realize expression for the firm G  revenue in 
DAM in the form given by (5) and what is the proper value for the parameter c ? To resolve 
that issues we propose the following algorithm for a regulator to mitigate the market power of 
the firm G . 
a. After the gate closure time for DAM bid/offer submission, the DAM is 
calculated using the standard procedure. That results in DAM 
outcome },{ *** YXZ  , a maximizer for (1), which is final for all the market 
players (including G ).  
b. Regulator estimates values of the technical parameters of G ’s generating units 
and the firm true DAM offer, which we denote by trueG  and 
true
GB  respectively. 
(Since regulator may not have full information needed to determine those 
quantities precisely, in general case trueG  and 
true
GB  differ from 
true
G  and 
true
GB ). 
New DAM calculation is performed substituting the firm’s DAM offer by 
true
GB . Let’s denote by },{ 
*
0
*
0
*
0 YXZ   the corresponding maximizer of (1) for 
that DAM calculation. Also let ),( *0
true
GXR   be the firm G  revenue from 
delivering *0X  in the DAM at the corresponding locational marginal prices 
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(obtained in the new DAM calculation) including all the applicable DAM side-
payments and uplifts/downlifts, associated with DAM solution *0 Z . 
c. Regulator makes a decision on whether the firm should be subject to 
antimonopoly regulation in DAM for that day. If the decision is made to apply 
the regulation, then DAM revenue for G  is set to  
)()(),( *0
**
0 YUYUXR GG
true
G  .      (8) 
d. The stated algorithm is known to the firm G  well in advance to be taken into 
account when composing its DAM offer. 
If the corresponding maximizer of (1) in “a” and/or “b” is not unique, then regulator has to 
choose the maximizer it finds appropriate. (In practice, the optimization problem is solved 
numerically, thus producing just one solution if any). 
Requiring equality of the firm DAM revenue (5) and its revenue in the case of the 
precise regulator’s estimate of trueGB  (i.e., when 
true
G
true
G BB  ), we have the following expression 
for the parameter c :  
)(),()(max),( *0
*
0
),,(
,
*
0
*
0
YUXRYUXRc
G
true
GG
XDY
Y
true
G
G
true
GY




. 
It is straightforward to verify that in the case of precise regulator estimate of trueGB  and if there 
are multiple maximizers for (1) with different maximizer choices made in “a” and “b”, the 
maximal value of ),( GX   on ),( G
true
GXDX   depends on the choice of 
*
0Z  made in “b” but 
is independent from the regulator’s choice for * Z  made in “a”. Hence, in this case the 
maximal value of the firm’s profit function (6) is not affected by multiplicity of optimal points 
for (1) in “a” but is influenced by the regulator decision in “b”.   
Thus, the DAM profit function of G , when it is subject to the proposed antimonopoly 
regulation mechanism, is given by 
)(),()()(max),( *0
*
0
),,(
,
YUXRXOYUX
G
true
G
true
GG
XDY
Y
G
GGY




. (9) 
The proposed algorithm involves the following actions by regulator: estimate of the firm G  
true DAM offer and decision on whether to apply the antimonopoly measure. Since complete 
information required to make them with absolute accuracy is unavailable to regulator, the 
cases where the firm is under/over regulated and DAM profit it receives differs from that 
obtained in the case of G  submitting at DAM its true offer are inevitable. For many other 
antimonopoly measures that uncertainty results in distortion of both volumes of goods 
delivered and the corresponding prices. However, if the problem (1) has unique solution in the 
case in question and the firm behaves rationally, the proposed method produces DAM 
outcome (i.e., the maximizer of (1)) as well as locational marginal prices identical to that in 
the case of the perfect competition and, hence, shields the nodal output/consumption volumes 
and the locational marginal prices from the market power of G . As uncertainty in estimations 
of the firm’s true costs and values of the technical parameters is still present, it results in the 
firm selling nodal power volumes at prices different from the corresponding locational 
marginal prices (and the applicable side-payments), that difference results in the 
corresponding uplift/downlift, which can be allocated among the other market players in a 
manner preserving the price signals formed by the market. If relative value of uplift/downlift 
is small, then it will not produce notable incentives for the market players to adjust their 
bids/offers accordingly and the final prices will be insignificantly distorted by the error in 
estimate made by regulator.  
The sum of the first two terms on RHS of (9) coincides with the DAM market surplus 
when the firm G  supplies X  and the other market players adjust their supply/withdrawal of 
power to maximize DAM treating X  as fixed. Thus, (9) (up to constant terms) coincides with 
DAM profit received by the firm in the case of perfect price discrimination of the residual 
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demand in all hours of the day. The last two terms on RHS of (9) are independent from Х  
and do not alter the maximizer of the function (9), but needed to deprive G  the share of 
market surplus intended for the other market players (as forecasted by the regulator).  
Thus the proposed method has a clear economic meaning: it models the market state 
when G  is able to perfectly price discriminate the residual demand and provides economic 
incentives for the firm to submit its true offer to DAM.  
Expression (9) also suggests the following interpretation of the profit 
function ),( GX  : is it the total market surplus, corresponding to a given Х  and optimal value 
of Y  for that Х , reduced by the other market players’ surplus corresponding to solution 
},{ *0
*
0
*
0 YXZ  . Since the latter surplus is independent from Х , the profit maximization 
problem of the firm G  is equivalent to the optimization of the total market surplus (i.e., the 
function )(ZU true ). Thus, the economic interest of the firm at DAM are aligned with that of 
the market.  
We also note, that if G  belongs to a group of generating companies having collusive 
strategies in DAM, then the stated algorithm should be applied treating G  as the group of 
firms. In this case (8) represents total group revenue, which should be further allocated 
between the individual firms in the group.   
 
IV.  Effect of uncertainty in the estimate of the firm’s true costs and values of the 
technical parameters 
 
Utilization of market power by a firm results in distortion of the market surplus obtained 
by the firm as well as that of the other market players. The latter is caused by two factors: 
reduction of the market utility function value and surplus redistribution between the firm and 
the other market players given the (reduced) value of the market utility function. Due to 
ability of the firm to distort market prices by varying its offer, the same decomposition takes 
place when the firm’s offer is subject to antimonopoly regulation based on the regulator’s 
estimate on the firm’s economic and technical aspects of production. In that case the 
distortion of the players’ market surplus results from the error in that estimate. 
For comparison we also consider the antimonopoly regulation method implying 
replacement of the firm’s offer by the regulator’s estimated offer trueGB  (we will refer to it as 
“standard” regulation method). It is straightforward to see from (9) that the market surplus of 
the other market players is the same in both proposed and “standard” regulation methods, 
provided that the firm subject to proposed antimonopoly regulation method behaves rationally 
(i.e., indicates its true costs and technical parameters limitations in the DAM offer to 
maximize its profit given by (9)). However, when the “standard” method is applied both 
abovementioned factors contribute, while in the case of the proposed regulation method only 
surplus redistribution occurs.   
To compare the profits received by G  in both methods for G
true
G   we note that 
st  - 
the firm’s profit when it is subject to the “standard” regulation method – is given by 
)(),( *0
*
0
st XOXR trueG
true
G   . Introducing deviation of the market utility function from its 
optimal value: )()( *0
*
0 ZUZUU
truetrue  , we obtain st*0 ),(   UX
true
G , where from (4) we 
have 0U . Moreover, when certain mathematical conditions are met
2
 and )( *0
*
0 ZZ   is small 
enough, then U  is zero up to the second and higher order terms in )( *0
*
0 ZZ  , if in addition 
                                                 
2
 For example in the case of Z  being a set of continuous variables only, the sufficient conditions are the 
following: both )(ZU true  and the constraints functions are smooth functions of Z , the set of constraints binding 
at *0ZZ   satisfies constraint qualification (such as linear independence condition) and is unaltered under 
*
0
*
0 ZZZ  . 
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)( *0
*
0 ZZ   depends smoothly on )(
*
0
*
0 XX  , then the firm G  receives the same profit in the 
both methods up to the second and higher order terms in )( *0
*
0 XX  .  
Thus, the proposed antimonopoly regulation method results in the same distortion of the 
other market players’ market surplus as the “standard” regulation method and potentially 
higher profit for the firm subject to regulation. However, the proposed method produces 
incentives for the firm to submit its true offer to the market and – if the firm behaves 
rationally – locational marginal prices and output volumes for all the market players are 
unaltered by the market power of the firm. If the resulting uplift/downlift for the market is 
insignificant for market players to adjust their bids/offers, the proposed method protects the 
market outcome (and, hence, the price signals) from being distorted by the market power of 
the firm. 
 
V. Special case: energy only DAM with fixed unit commitment schedule 
 
In the previous section we developed the market power mitigation method in quite general 
setting with parameters of the generating units entering not only the generating units’ 
constraints but possibly also the other constraints. That occurs, for example, in the cases of 
DAM jointly optimizing both power output and provision of ancillary services or DAM 
simultaneously solving both unit commitment and economic dispatch problems.  
Explicitly, G - parameters of the generating units’ of the firm G - may enter not only the 
generating units’ constraints )},({ GG XC   but also (some of) the other constraints 
)},({ ZC
G
. In this case, ),,( XD GGY   - the feasible set for variables Y  - depends not only 
on X  and G  but also on variables G . For example in DAM with integrated unit 
commitment procedure the set ),,( XD GGY   depends on G  
due to the reserve adequacy 
constraints. 
In this section we will focus on the case of DAM market with G  effectively entering 
only the generating unit constraints for the power producer, i.e., the constraints }{ C  can be 
transformed in the following equivalent form )},(),,({}{ 
GGGG
ZCXCC   with 
)},({ GG XC   being the generating units’ constraints of the firm G  and )},({ GG ZC   being 
independent from G .
3
  (That constraints property is satisfied, for example, in the case of 
energy only DAM with set unit commitment schedule). Hence, ZS  is independent from 
G
 and (14) entails that ),( XDY    for a given )( XDX   is independent from 
G
 : ),(  XDD
GYY
 . (We note, that G  restricts possible values of X  through the 
condition )( XDX  , however, once the feasible value of X  is chosen, the set ),( XD GY   is 
independent from G ). Therefore, the profit function  , defined in (6), is also independent 
from G , and one can probe all ),( GGX
GG
DX 



  to find profit maximizing values of X . 
Utilizing (15) we obtain  
                                                 
3
 The constraints which are functions of X  only and independent from  can be included either in a set 
)},({ GG XC   or )},({ GG ZC   without affecting the considerations below. 
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),(),(
G
true
GXD D
GG
GGX


 

 . 
 
Thus, in the case of energy only DAM with fixed unit commitment schedule the profit 
maximization problem for the firm G  takes the form 
 
)(max 
),(
,
X
G
true
GXDX
X


 , with cXOYUX
true
GG
XDY
Y
GY


)()(max)(
),(
,

 .  (10) 
From the discussion above it follows that (10) has at least one value of ),(
G
true
GXDX  , 
which maximizes )(X , namely, 
*
0XX  . Given any ),( G
true
GXDX  , which a solution to 
(10), a proper value of GG   can be (possibly non-uniquely) chosen so that 
),(
GGX
DX  : one such value is given by trueGG   .  
 We also note that  



















),(maxmax),(max)(max
),(
,
),(
,
),,(
),,(
,,,
),,(
,,
YXUYXUZU true
XDY
Y
DX
X
true
XDY
DX
YX
true
DZ
Z
GY
GG
GGX
GG
GY
GGX
G
GG
GGZ
G










)()(max),(maxmax *0
),,(),(
,
),(
,
ZUZUYXU truetrue
DZ
Z
true
XDY
Y
DX
X
G
true
GZ
GYG
true
GX











 
. 
Therefore, assumption stated by equation (4) holds in the case of energy only DAM with 
fixed unit commitment schedule. 
 
VI. Link to the locational marginal prices 
 
Let’s consider the firm G  subject to the proposed antimonopoly regulation in DAM for 
all hours of the day. Without loss of generality we consider the case when generating units of 
the firm are assigned to different nodes labeled by i . Let the firm’s generating units, 
scheduled to operate at hour h  as a result of DAM calculation (1), be assigned to a set of 
nodes hI . We denote as 
hix ,  the power output of the firm G  generating unit, scheduled to 
produce at hour h  and located at the node hIi , }{
,hixx   is a subset of Х . (The power 
outputs of these units corresponding to DAM solution *Х  are denoted as }{ ,** hixx  ). If the 
Envelope Theorem [22] is applicable to the optimization problem  
)(max 
),(
,
YU
G
XDY
Y
Y 
 
with x  treated as external parameters in some open neighborhood of *xx   in Euclidean 
space with dimension 
h
hI ||  (with all the other variables, which belong to Х , being fixed at 
values corresponding to *Х ), then hi, - the locational marginal price in node i  at hour h , 
hIi ,  - is given by 
)(max)( 
),(
,,
, YU
x
x
G
XDY
Yhi
hi
Y 




  
in that neighborhood. Therefore, 
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hi
x
x hIi
hiG
XDY
YG
XDY
Y
dxYUYU
h
YY
,
,
,
),(
,
),(
,
*
*
)(max)(max  


 

,  (11) 
where the integral in calculated over any continuous curve connecting the points *x  and x  in 
the neighborhood and the second term on LHS is independent from x . Since the integrand is 
a gradient of a function, the value of the integral doesn’t depend on the choice of the curve. 
One such choice is given by a path from *x  to x  such that each segment is a straight line 
parallel to one of the axes in the Euclidian space: in this case integration over given segment 
represents perfect price discrimination of the proper part of the residual demand faced by one 
generating unit of G  in a particular hour with output volumes of the other generating units of 
the firm in that hour as well as output volumes of all generating units of G  in the other hours 
of the day fixed at the values corresponding to the starting endpoint at the segment. (We note 
that assumption on applicability of the Envelope Theorem entails that all x  can be varied 
independently, which implies that ),( XD GY   doesn’t induce any binding constraints on x ). 
 
VII. Conclusions and directions for future work 
 
Electricity markets are prone to exercise of market power by producers, which reduces 
productive and allocative efficiency of the market, distorts price signals, and results in 
associated deadweight loss. Exercise of market power leads to deformations of both nodal 
power output and consumption volumes as well as locational marginal prices.  
We propose a method of antimonopoly regulation which forms economic incentives for a 
producer to offer its true cost and disclose faithful values of its generating units technical 
parameters, entering the DAM constraints. Application of the method to the profit 
maximizing firm results in the values of locational marginal prices and nodal 
output/consumption volumes in all nodes of the power system identical to those in the case of 
the firm offering its true short-run marginal cost and indicating the actual technical parameters 
of its generating units. Hence, the firm’s nodal output volumes are identical to those in the 
case of its perfectly competitive behavior. 
The method requires regulator to estimate the producer’s power output costs and values of 
technical parameters, which objectively involves a degree of uncertainty as regulator may not 
have full information on the producer’s economical and technical aspects of power 
production. However, an error in the estimate affects neither nodal output/consumption 
volumes nor locational marginal prices but manifests itself in the final prices through an 
overall uplift/downlift for the market, which implies redistribution of market surplus among 
the market players without affecting the total market surplus. The uplift/downlift may be 
allocated among the other market players in a way preserving the price signals produced by 
the market. If the associated uplift/downlift for the market is relatively small, it doesn’t 
produce incentives for the market players to account for it in their market bids/offers. We also 
note that large discrepancy between the firm’s true DAM offer and its estimate by regulator 
may result not only in significant uplift/downlift for the market but also in substantial extra 
profit or even losses for the firm subject to the antimonopoly regulation. 
It may prove to be fruitful to extend the present analysis to two-settlement power market 
system with arbitrage between DAM and real-time market. 
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Mathematical Appendix 
 
Let’s define maps
X : XYXZ  },{ , Y : YYXZ  },{ . Then, )( XD  is an 
image of )( ZD  in XM  under X , and ),( XDY    for )( XDX   is an image of 
)]}({)([ YZ MXXD   in YM  under the map Y : 
 )( XD )]([  ZX D , ),( XDY   = )]}({)([ Y YZ MXXD   for )( XDX  . (12) 
We also have 
)()])([)(   ZYGXZ SMSD  , 
therefore, (12) implies  
 )]([)()(  ZXGXX SSD             (13) 
and  
)]}({)([),( Y YZY MXXSXD     for )( XDX  .          (14) 
For ZS  independent from G , (13) entails 
    )]([)()]([)(),( GZXSSSD S
GG
GX
GG
GZXGX
GG
GGX


 














, 
 and application of )()(
true
GXGX SS
GG




  yields 
),()]([)(),(
G
true
GXGZX
true
GXD DSS
GG
GGX


 

 . (15) 
 
